Presidential Use Of Force Essay Research Paper

Presidential Use Of Force Essay, Research Paper

Brooks Rockwell

POSC 423

Asignment #1

Presidential Use of Force

When the framers of the Constitution constructed the executive branch of government, they envisioned a president with certain limited powers. Having delegated to the president a specific type of authority, the framers would probably be surprised to see that they had actually created a rather dynamic officer. The presidency is continually changing over time. That is, the power of the president has been both increased and decreased a various stages in history. Opportunites for change did not generally result from the characteristics of individual presidents, but rather came as a result of specific historic occurrences that impacted the nation as a whole. For example, the Civil War created a forum that expanded presidential power, whereas certain acts of Congress have contracted the president’s power. Although the framers of the Constitution may not have intended to create such an executive, the presidency of today has more power, greater responsibility, higher demands and expectations; and the US toady is the world’s military and economic superpower.

Presidential power when viewed from a constitutional perspective, is both specific and obscure; specific in that some elements of presidential power are clearly spelled out; obscure in that the limits and boundries of presidential power are either ill-defined or open to vast differences in interpretation. In an effort to understand presidential power, the Constitution is a starting point, but it provides few definitive answers. The Constitution, as it relates to the powers of the presiden, raises more questions than it answers.

As historical circumstances have changed, so too has the meaning or interpretation of the Constitution. The scope and meaning of the executive clause in Article II of the Constitution has changed to meet the needs of the times and wishes of strong presidents. The skeleton-like provisions of Article II have left the words open to definition and redefinition by courts and presidents. This skeleton-like wording leaves it up to an aggressive chief executive and a willing Supreme Court to shape the actual parameters of such powers. In effect, history has rewritten the Constitution. The words are flexible enough to mean different things in different situation. On the whole though, a more expansive view of presidential power has taken precedence over a more restrictive view. The history of the meaning of presidential power through the Constitution has been one of the expansion of power and the enlargement of the meaning of the words of the Constitution.

The numerous “undeclared wars” of the twentieth century also presented an avenue for Congress to supress the executive. The widespread disapproval of the Vietnam War was the last straw for American legislators. Congress felt the need to limit the president’s ability to engage in military conflicts with forgein lands without their consent. The War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973, created their desired limitations. This act required that any use of American troops in potentially hostile situations must be reported to Congress. In addition, the military action must stop within sixty days of the submission of the report, and that Congress can end the use of the military at any time by passing a concurrent resolution, which is not subject to a presidential veto (Edwards 480).

Since its passage, this Act has been overlooked on numerous occassions. Many military actions have occurred: the evacuations from Southeast Asia (1975), the rescue of the Mayaquez from Cambodia (1975), the Iran hostage rescue (1980), the invasion of Grenada (1983), and the Persian Gulf conflicts (1991 and 1998) (Edwards 480). Each of these instances went unreported to Congress, except for the Persian Gulf. Yet, Bush was criticized for waiting until the last minute to appear before Congress.

President Bush clearly fullfilled his constitutional obligations, for he sought and gained explicit congressional authorization to commit US forces to combat if Saddam Hussein failed to withdraw from Kuwait by the United Nations established deadline of January 15, 1991. However, because Bush waited until the last minute to request such approval; with 400,000 US troops poised to attack and the ultimatum only days away, Congress had to debate hurriedly. Moreover, Bush complied reluctantly with the constitutional process, insisting that he did not need congressional authorization and would act without it. He could not, however, ignore the pressure from leaders in both parties, the media, and public opinion to go to Congress. Privately fearing that a prolonged debate or unfavorable outcome would weaken the international coalition and play to Saddam Hussein’s advantage, Bush gambled that he could secure support for a war resolution. The slender majorities in Congress (52 -47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House) (Milkis 361) effectively ended public debate, but also illustrate just how little support President Bush was enjoying.

The debate in the House of Representatives did not approach the drama of that in the Senate, where the vote was certain to be close. While critics of Bush’s policy reiterated the argument that he was rushing to war without allowing time to for sanctions to be effective, they complained time