Political Theory Responses To Locke Montesqieu Marx

Political Theory Responses To Locke, Montesqieu, Marx And Rousseau Essay, Research Paper

Realism or Idealism: Responses to Locke, Montesqieu,

Rousseau and Marx regarding human nature

In the history of the western intellectual tradition, a simple (though not simplistic) way of seeing philosophers of social thought is to place them in one of two categories: realism or idealism. Depending on what category they best fit in, one can draw conclusions about their respective theories of human nature, which in turn influences their whole philosophical project s ends. The four philosophers covered in this seminar all have distinct theories of human nature, and while reading and thinking about them, it was helpful for me to ask the following questions: What is the basic view of human nature of the philosopher. (i.e. is man basically cooperative and nonviolent or is he basically at his core an aggressor and selfish), Does he think human nature can be changed. and If it can be changed (or if it is perfectable), does the change come voluntarily or through coercion.

First, I define my terms. By “realism” I mean the trajectory of thought in the western intellectual and philosophical tradition that emphasizes the here-and-now, and posits that there is not an ideal image or way of doing things to which we must conform our agendas of rule and justice. I propose that “realism” is related to concepts like conflict as a fact of life, and aggression as a factor in man s motivations, and materialism (that people and everything else is constituted of matter only, and not, say, “spirit” as per Plato s idealism or the dualism of Christianity).

By “idealism,” I mean that train of thought in the west that identifies with ideas like there being a dualism of reality (matter and spirit) and that the world of ideals is a model for us to imitate, toward the end of moral or social perfection. Idealism at once holds that human nature is basically good and that when it is bad, it can be changed, perfected, improved. It sees people as being basically giving and socially interested, and interested in the good of the whole, if they would just have the right kind of education. It allows that conflict exists but that it doesn t need to exist that peace is possible through education.

Of the four philosophers none fits wholly into one of these two camps. Still, the two categories are useful for my reflection on the philosophers. Looking at Rousseau first, I see him as the most idealistic, the one evincing “idealism” most, of the four. He sees the distant past of man, as an animal in nature, as being man s natural state, a state he has left with society s development. Rousseau argues that this natural man has basically two kinds of drives within him: first, he is selfish toward the end of self-preservation, and yet, secondly, he also feels a repugnance to seeing any other living thing suffer. He sees man as being basically good. The problem in human nature crops up through the existence of private property, which is contrary to the state mankind was in nature. Rousseau solves this problem through the social contract, which is government consented by the masses for the common interest.

My response to his theory of human nature is twofold. (1) Contrary to Rousseau s theories, new knowledge about the nature of man in the wild (from ethologists like Conrad Lorenz or Lionel Tiger Men in Groups) provides evidence that man in his basic nature is an aggressor. This evidence is powerfully explanatory of many of our social ills, asserting that homo sapiens has a will to dominate and achieve an ever increasing standing in the social hierarchy, and that this factor and not the mere possession of private property, is largely responsible for inequality. Rousseau seems to think that politics alone is enough to change human nature that the government can legislate away the equality vs. freedom dilemma. (2) I also see that Rousseau in his glorification of the natural man fails to acknowledge that even man in society is natural per se, since man doesn t become “supernatural” or “unnatural” in society. Using increasingly complex tools to fashion increasingly complex ways of living doesn t change the fact that man is still essentially natural, for he isn t unnatural or supernatural, but merely more complex. This line of thought anticipates later critiques on “state of nature” theories which altogether dismiss them as bifurcating the sensible world into natural and unnatural, which is the same slippery slope as dividing it between natural and supernatural (as in the postmodern and post-Nietzschean critiques of “nature” and “natural law.”)

Marx s critique of capitalism and his solution of communism starts at the same place as Rousseau that we live in a corrupt society and are plagued by problems and challenges that the modern world presents. Marx, like Rousseau, has a basically positive view of human nature, and his theory of the natural state of man being one of cooperation can be seen in the same line as Rousseau s. Marx, like Rousseau, has three states of man. The first of these categories of man is like Rousseau s “natural man” in a state of natural society. The same holds for the second category, much like Rousseau s modern man who is alienated because of economic inequality (though Marx adds to and tweaks this part of Rousseau to emphasize economic and not social inequality,