Can Plato Adequately Respond To Thrasymachus

’s Immoralist View Of Justice. Essay, Research Paper

In Book 1 of the ‘Republic’, Socrates, in answer to the question ‘What is Justice.’ is presented with a real and dangerous alternative to what he thinks to be the truth about Justice. Julia Annas believes Thrasymachus thinks Justice and Injustice do have a real existence that is independent of human institutions; and that Thrasymachus makes a decided commitment to Injustice. She calls this view ‘Immoralism’: “the immoralist holds that there is an important question about justice, to be answered by showing that injustice is better.” This essay identifies this ‘Immoral’ view before understanding if and how Plato can respond to it. How does Plato attempt to refute Thrasymachus’s argument. Is he successful.

Initially Thrasymachus states that Justice is ‘nothing else but the interest of the stronger’. Cross and Woozley identify four possible interpretations; the Naturalistic definition, Nihilistic view, Incidental comment, and the more useful Essential analysis. The ‘Essential Analysis’: “An action is just if and only if it serves the interest of the stronger,” with Thrasymachus stating the disadvantages of Justice and advantages of Injustice. This leads to problems with the stronger man, is it merely the promotion of self-interests. If Justice favours the interests of the stronger, is this simply from the perception of the weak with morality not concerning the stronger. Cross re-formulates Thrasymachus’s view as ‘Justice is the promotion of the ‘strongers’ interest’, therefore both weak and strong can act justly in furthering the strongers interests. However, complication occurs when we understand that Justice is another’s good: “You are not aware that justice or right is really what is good for someone else.” This entails Justice supports the interests of the strong from the weak, but additionally the interest of the subjects from the ruler. Confusion lies in Thrasymachus’s argument; can Plato adequately respond to Thrasymachus.

Inconsistency creeps into Thrasymachus’s argument, a) that Justice is in the interest of the stronger, and b) justice is another’s good, concluding that Justice is confined to the weaker. This view is demolished when Thrasymachus claims that a ruler can be either just or unjust; the inconsistency cannot be resolved. The two possibilities coincide in the weaker person not the stronger. As he favours injustice as the pursuit of one’s own interest, to paraphrase Cross, when Thrasymachus thinks about the just and unjust ruler, it is in terms of another’s good rather than in the interest of the stronger.

Socrates agrees with Thrasymachus: “what is right is an interest.” , but he reveals the inconsistency between obeying the rulers and what promotes the rulers’ interests by introducing a ‘wrong law’. With Thrasymachus’s admission that Rulers are not infallible another dilemma appears. Must a subject disobey a wrong law, thus serving the rulers interest, or obey it and disobey the ruler’s interests. He later states that in the true sense, a ruler that is mistaken is not really a ruler; similarly a mistaken doctor ceases in the true sense to be a doctor. Thus, a ruler/expert can never be wrong about his interests, as when mistaken they cease to be an expert. Hence, Thrasymachus avoids Socrates’s dilemma, leaving no possibility for the subject to act contrary to the ruler’s interests. Plato misses an opportunity to ridicule Thrasymachus’s argument. Not only is Thrasymachus’s ‘mistake’ analogy ridiculous, i.e. a doctor simply becomes a bad doctor; moreover, it implies the subject can decide the rulers interests, and thus only obey the ruler if he thinks it’s in his [rulers] interest. Thus making the subject the stronger and in control. Plato could have used Thrasymachus’s own argument to refute him but instead, as Cross identifies, attacks him on three lines of Socratic attack. Did Plato have an opportunity to adequately respond to Thrasymachus.

Firstly, Socrates uses an analogy of the doctor, showing that a ruler does not govern in his own interest. Socrates states that the art of medicine is not for self-interest but for the patient; he is not a doctor because he makes money but because he helps the sick. From this example, Socrates says, “no science studies or enforces the interest of the controlling party or stronger party, but rather that of the weaker party subjected to it.” Socrates assumes the political ruler practices his art of ruling in the interest of his subjects. Annas criticizes Socrates’s statements, saying that to believe skills are practiced solely for the benefit of others is “absurdly optimistic.” She also claims that moneymaking, as a separate skill, is a very artificial argument.

Thrasymachus responds with a shepherd. The art of the shepherd, fattening the sheep, is not done for the sheep’s benefit. Similarly, rulers look after themselves (seemingly benevolent) but realistically exploit the subjects as the shepherd exploits his sheep. Socrates made a fatal error by introducing the doctor analogy, as both arguments hinge upon the same premises. If Socrates is right then so is Thrasymachus as they both argue from two specific points to huge generalizations. In addition, Socrates, by stating a skill is fulfilled in the interests of that which it rules, encourages fatuous assumptions e.g. that the sculptor acts for the good of the stone, the painter for