Bismarck

’s Handling On Domestic Policy From 1871-1890 Essay, Research Paper

‘Inept and Unsuccessful’. How Valid is this Comment on Bismarck’s handling of Domestic Policy from 1871-90.

From her formal unification at Versailles in 1871, Bismarck, the first German Chancellor, took control of his new German State. Yet twenty years later, the ‘Bismarckian era’ in German history had ended, culminating in Bismarck’s departure. With unification complete at least geographically, by 1871, Bismarck’s next challenge lay with domestic policy and the running of the new German constitution.

In the early 1870s, Bismarck relied on the support of the National Liberals in the Reichstag as they were the largest single party. Bismarck acted to strengthen the newly created state in order to ensure its prosperity, and succeeded in establishing the State bank (Reichsbank) and adopting the gold standard. Bismarck also formed a National Court of Appeal that helped to promote feelings of a united state. With industry and economy booming, one could say that Bismarck was relatively successful during ‘foundation time’, opposing the suggestion.

Yet Bismarck was a pragmatist, and just as he had changed policies prior to 1870, so he continued to change his line of attack in the post-1870

period. Following the impact of the ‘Great Depression’ in Europe, the political basis upon which Bismarck had founded his power was undermined, and so Bismarck was forced to return to more protectionist policies. Added to the fact that in the Balkans there had been split alliances, the National Liberals and Bismarck were further split here. Not only did they oppose his rule of parliament, constitutional rule, but they were opposed to the policy of protectionism that Bismarck proposed, being in favour of free-trade. Bismarck had his reasons; to gain the support of industrialists, landowners, Conservatives and Centre Parties, creating income for the people, and it wasn’t an unusual European trend. This shows that such a policy was not of inept thinking or of unskilful judgement. To add to this, Bismarck was successful in carrying out his policy.

Bismarck managed to convince the people at the 1878 election that protectionism was the way forward and subsequently the National Liberals were defeated. Tariffs were imposed, and a new political pattern of Conservative dominance emerged, which Bismarck had hoped for. Bismarck also managed here to strengthen German unity by showing the people that it was in German interests from Europe competition. Hence a successful policy for Bismarck, and not as suggested by the comment.

The ‘Kulturkampf’ that emerged during the 1870s brought Bismarck his first major political defeat. This ’struggle for civilisation’ within Germany, were Bismarck’s attempts to hold off the threat he saw as Catholicism. Bismarck’s aim in domestic policy was for a united Reich, socially and politically. To achieve this, he had to rid of threats to Protestantism, so as to create the Protestantized Germany that he wanted. The Catholics were ’something to hate for unity’.

Most of the southern and Rhine states were Catholic. The new empire mixed Protestants and Catholics, yet the Catholics were still in a minority. They had formed the Centre party, and won 57 seats in the 1871 election. Bismarck saw this party as a grave danger to the unity he wanted to create, especially as he knew they would always obey Rome and not Berlin. In one sense here, it can be said that Bismarck’s execution of the ‘Kulturkampf’ was not inept or even a wrong decision to take. Bismarck had his aims and merely tried to establish them, whilst eradicating possible threats to them.

However one could not say that Bismarck was successful in this course of action, backing up the suggested comment. Bismarck had attacked the Catholic Church over the issue of ‘Papal Infallibility’ by using the press, which was followed by the expulsion of Jesuits. In 1873, Bismarck passed anti-Catholic legislation better known as the ‘May Laws’, which included state control of the Church and clerical appointments, with civil marriages made compulsory; another attack on the Church. Yet the campaign had the opposite effect, strengthening Catholic morale, so that in the 1874 election their seat tally rose. Pope Pius IX fought Bismarck, yet by the time of his passing; the German Chancellor had realised that it was an impossible situation. The Church had more strength and support than Bismarck had estimated, and he was hence unsuccessful.

Bismarck even admitted that there was now no reason to attack Catholics, if there ever had been, so seeming inept. The ‘Kulturkampf’ had been a failure. It had increased disunity, not removed it, and by 1880, the repeal of the ‘May Laws’ had commenced. This period of Bismarck’s backs up the suggestion over his handling of domestic policy that he was unsuccessful. As a result, he even allied himself with the Centre party when the issue of protectionism followed. His next political witchhunt was aimed against the socialists.

The Socialists were anti-monarchist revolutionaries, and were hence an obvious target for Bismarck. He became increasingly alarmed by the increasing success of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), winning 12 seats in 1877. Again, as in with the Catholic conflict, he misjudged the situation by overestimating instead of underestimating the enemy.