Philosophy Berkeley Essay Research Paper Dupee mozillaPhilosophy

Philosophy Berkeley Essay, Research Paper

Dupee, mozilla

Philosophy

The initial groundwork for Berkeley’s position is the truism

that the materialist is a skeptic. In the writing of his three

dialogues, Berkeley develops two characters: Hylas (the materialist)

and Philonous (Berkeley himself). Philonous draws upon one central

supposition of the materialist to formulate his argument of skepticism

against him; this idea is that one can never perceive the real essence

of anything. In short, the materialist feels that the information

received through sense experience gives a representative picture of

the outside world (the representative theory of perception), and one

can not penetrate to the true essece of an object. This makes logical

sense, for the only way to perceive this real essence would be to

become the object itself! Although the idea is logical, it does

contain a certain grounding for agnosticism. Let the reader consider

this: if there is no way to actually sense the true material essence

of anything, and all knowledge in empiricism comes from the senses,

then the real material essence can not be perceived and therefore it

can not be posited. This deserves careful consideration, for the

materialist has been self-proclaimed a skeptic! If the believer in

this theory were asked if a mythical beast such as a cyclops existed

he would most certainly say no. As part of his reply he might add that

because it can not be sensed it is not a piece of knowledge. After

being enlightened by the above proposed argument, though, that same

materialist is logically forced to agree that, because the “material

substratum1″ itself can not be sensed, its existence can not be

treated as knowledge. The materialist belief has, in effect, become as

futile as proving that the cyclops exists; his ideas have lead him

into skepticism.

Having proven that the materialist is, at best, a doubter,

Berkeley goes on to offer the compelling argument that primary and

secondary qualities are, together, one thing. As the materialist

believes, primary qualities of an object are those things that are

abstract (not sense oriented). Examples of these would be number,

figure, motion, and extension. Secondary qualities are those things

that are concrete (sense oriented), such as color, smell, sound, and

taste. The materialist feels that these primary qualities persist even

when the secondary ones are not there. Thus, if a person were blind,

then that individual would not be able to hear or to touch items; yet

the so-called real qualities such as figure would remain existent in

the objects. As previously shown, the materialist is agnostic in his

belief of these real (primary) qualities. It is here that Berkeley

directs an alternate hypothesis: that the abstract primary qualities

don’t exist at all. In fact, the immaterialist position states that

these qualities are merely secondary in nature, as they, too, can not

be perceived as being separate from an object. For instance, if a

person is asked to imagine a primary quality alone, as an abstraction,

it is impossible. To illustrate this point, suppose that a person is

asked to think simply of number alone. This person may reply that the

idea he is formulating is that of three red spheres. In truth this is

not an abstract idea, because when the qualities of color (red) and

shape (sphere) are taken away, all that is left is three of nothing!

Thus, it is impossible to think of the abstraction of number, given

that an abstract quality can not focus on anything concrete (such as

red spheres in the above mentioned example). Therefore, it follows

that, since no primary, abstract quality can exist alone, it is the

same as a secondary quality in which an actual object must first be

perceived.

Berkeley moves on to show that the perceived qualities of an

object are ideas which exist only in a mind. To do this, he states

that a sensation is an idea. This is logical, for sensations can not

be felt by mindless objects. However, it is this point which Berkeley

scrutinizes in the materialist statement that an external object “is a

material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.2″ The

materialist is proclaiming that sensible qualities, which exist in the

mind only, are actually in the object. Logically, the only possible

way for this to occur is if the external object had a mind for the

qualities to be thought of and stored by. The notion that inanimate

objects have minds is ridiculous, and thus the materialists’ belief

has been reduced to absurdity. Let the reader consider this example to

reinforce the point. A ten-story building is erected, and a person who

lives in a single-story house in the country sees the new building. To

this person the structure may see

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