Euthanasia Is Wrong Essay Research Paper Active

Euthanasia Is Wrong Essay, Research Paper

Active Euthanasia:

Physician-Assisted Suicide is wrong

Abstract

Introduction

The issue at hand is whether physician-assisted suicide should be legalized for patients who are terminally ill and/or enduring prolonged suffering. In this debate, the choice of terms is central. The most common term, euthanasia, comes from the Greek words meaning “good death.” Sidney Hook calls it “voluntary euthanasia,” and Daniel C. Maguire calls it “death by choice,” but John Leo calls it “cozy little homicides.” Eileen Doyle points out the dangers of a popular term, “quality-of-life.” The choice of terms may serve to conceal, or to enhance, the basic fact that euthanasia ends a human life. Different authors choose different terms, depending on which side of the issue they are defending.

Maguire argues by defining his terms. After explaining on page 447 how difficult it is to decide “to impose death,” he says on page 448 that it is a moral argument, not a legal argument. In the final sentence of the fifth paragraph, he contends that “morality and legality are not identical.” His transition, the first sentence of the sixth paragraph, invites the reader to “face up to the objection.” The objection, according to the fourth paragraph, is “that there is no moral way in which death could be imposed on a person who is incapable of consent because of youth or irreversible loss of consciousness.” The fifth paragraph begins by admitting the truth of this objection. These transitions tie together an argument that seems to agree with the objection, while defining the terms of the argument. When all the terms have been defined, however, the objection is rejected. He argues that, in some cases, it would be “morally good . . . to terminate a life” (p. 448). The terminology here is neutral; we are not talking about a good death, or a bad death, but simply an end to life. It is not murder, and it is not suicide. It is not emotionally loaded at all. In real life, however, the question of euthanasia is, and should be, filled with emotion.

Maguire acknowledges the argument that acceptance of the practice of euthanasia could lead society down the path toward the “mass murder of physically and mentally defective persons” (p. 449). He argues, however, that the specific case under examination is “drastic,” and our behavior in a “drastic” case cannot be generalized to our behavior in normal situations. In fact, if we keep that particular defective child alive, then we are defining our terms wrongly. We are committing the “error of interpreting the sanctity of life in merely physical terms” (p. 449). First, he uses the example of a fetus, which is not yet a person, but which is capable of becoming a person. This image is followed by a transition, at the end of the tenth paragraph, to his next idea, which is that life might sometimes “be terminated when other sacred values outweigh its claims to life in a conflict situation” (p. 449). Maguire’s idea of the correct definition of “the sanctity of life,” in the eleventh paragraph, is a “generic notion” that fails to take account of “sacred human dignity,” and he proposes that “the sanctity of death might here take precedence over a physicalist interpretation of the sanctity of life” (pp. 449-450). In other words, he is offering new terms that reverse the old terminology. The terminology is central to his argument.

As soon as we replace Maguire’s terms with simpler words, his argument begins to fall apart. For example, if we replace “termination of life” with the simpler term, “death,” a chill fills the space once occupied by the more neutral, more technical term. Termination of life is scientific, clinical, and easy. Death, on the other hand, is cold, frightening, and difficult. In at least every third paragraph, Maguire reminds the reader that he is putting off the question of who should make the decision. He is only arguing that, in some cases, termination of life is more morally acceptable than prolonging life. Using another example, Maguire argues, “The decision to let live is not inherently safe” (p. 451). However, his terminology is deceptive–”safe” is not the same kind of term as “moral.” Often, the morally right course of action is not safe. For example, if I do not murder my neighbor, then tomorrow my neighbor might murder me, especially if we do not like each other. But my possible future safety does not make it right for me to murder my neighbor. This kind of thinking, in terms of safety, can lead to vigilante actions, such as lynching.

Perhaps some people do not forgive others for letting them live. Perhaps they do not feel that they have the freedom to commit suicide, but they do not have a right to demand that someone else commit murder, just to relive them of the responsibility of making their own life-and-death decisions. Maguire talks about risk, but there is no such thing as life without risk. Anyone can suddenly become ill, or get into an automobile accident, or simply grow old. In addition, perfectly normal, healthy people sometimes live in misery, poverty, and want. Should they be offered “termination of life” as a moral alternative. Maguire keeps avoiding the real question: Who is to decide when death is better than life.

Maguire never answers the all important question: Who should decide. He simply holds that, in certain drastic si