Skepticism Unrefuted

– Strawson, Stroud And Other Essay, Research Paper

Skepticism Unrefuted: Strawson, Stroud and Other MindsProf. Stroud uses P.F. Strawson’s “Persons” to refute skepticism about other minds. But does the refutation succeed. I doubt it. Strawson is correct that “in order to ascribe experiences to oneself in the way that one does, one must ‘also ascribe them (or be prepared to ascribe them) other others who are not oneself,’” but his analysis of the meaning of “person” doesn’t follow. And even if it did, Strawson’s work is completely irrelevant to the problem of other minds: for all that he does is provide a conceptual analysis of “person” without proving that the concept has any real-world referents other than oneself – hence skepticism remains untouched. Put another way, before one could know that there were other persons, one would first have to know that they had minds. Hence to use the concept of a person to solve the problem of other minds, in Hume’s famous words, “must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.”12. Strawson on Ascription of Mental PredicatesStrawson states that if we ascribe mental predicates to ourselves, we must at least “be prepared” to ascribe them to others. “It means, for example, that the ascribing phrases should be used in just the same sense when the subject is another, as when the subject is oneself. The dictionaries do not give two sets of meanings for every expression which describes a state of consciousness.”2 And presumably, since we do in fact ascribe mental predicates to ourselves, we must in fact be prepared to ascribe them to others. I see no objection.Strawson’s troubles begin once he tries to use this principle to establish that the concept of a person is “primitive.” Let us first hear the argument in his own words: “[1] one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others; [2] one can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience; [3] and one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience.”3 (numbers mine) Unfortunately, there is a major equivocation here. When Strawson says that one “can ascribe states of consciousness” does he mean that it is logically possible to do so. Or does he think that it must be possible in fact. On either meaning, the argument doesn’t work. If Strawson means logical possibility, then premise #3 is incorrect. It is at least conceivable that someone could have the ability to identify other minds only as subjects of experience – with telepathy, perhaps. It would be hard to argue that it is logically impossible to notice others’ mental states without noticing their bodies. Or suppose that we interpret Strawson the other way. Now premise #1 seems dubious. Isn’t it at least possible that I am empirically able to pick out myself, but lack the faculties to pick out others. Indeed, this is precisely what the other-minds-skeptic is saying: You can know that you’re conscious, but not that anyone else is. So on either reading the argument fails.I think that Strawson’s initial premise is unobjectionable: if it is meaningful to say that I am conscious, then it is meaningful to say that you are conscious. But this hardly shows that I am able to know if you are conscious; it only shows that it is meaningful to assert it. And the empirical possibility remains that I am quite able to know if I am conscious, even though I could never tell if you were. Unfortunately, Strawson appears to equivocate later in the argument, leading him to think that it is somehow illogical to affirm knowledge of oneself and deny knowledge of others. But if we read the initial premise strictly (and take seriously his “dictionary” argument) then we see that it discusses nothing but the meanings of mental predicates, not our ability to locate their presence in ourselves or others.3. Persons and Other MindsTo his credit, Strawson does not explicitly claim that his analysis of the concept of persons solves the problem of other minds. But Prof. Stroud apparently does, and perhaps Strawson thinks that his analysis helps. This section will show that even if Strawson’s analysis of person were completely correct, his article doesn’t take us any closer to a solution to the skeptical problem of other minds.Strawson argues that the concept of a person is “primitive.” As he puts it, “The concept of a person is not to be analyzed as that of an animated body or an embodied anima.”4 At first, this might seem to solve the problem of other minds. If the concept of a person – an entity with both mental and physical aspects – is coherent, and if the concepts of a mindless body or a disembodied mind are incoherent, then the problem is indeed solved. The skeptic might ask, “How do you know that these creatures around you aren’t just bodies without any mental life.” And Strawson, on this interpretation, could reply, “The concept of a person can’t be so analyzed; your notion of a mindless body is incoherent.” Put more formally:1. The concept of a person – an entity with both mental and physical attributes, is coherent.2. The concepts of a body without a mind and a mind without a body are incoherent.3. Therefore, any body you see must also be a person, i.e., must also have mental states.Now this argument would follow from the premises and would solve the problem of other minds. However, Strawson explicitly contradicts this argume