How Close To Nuclear War Did The

Cuban Missile Cri Essay, Research Paper

HOW CLOSE TO NUCLEAR WAR DID THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS COME.Neither Khrushchev nor Castro seemed to have any fear that missile placement in Cuba would lead to a nuclear war. The U.S. believed that the Soviets were planting nuclear missiles in Cuba as response to American installation in Turkey. The intention of the missiles was protection from invasion of the island by U.S. troops who had supposedly been moved to the eastern U.S.A. “U.S. intelligence had estimated that there were 10,000 Soviet troops and 40,000 Cuban troops on the island. In actual fact there were 40,000 Soviet troops, and the Cuban soldiers numbered 270,000.” (Anonymous, November 7, 1983, Time, p. 50 ” The Soviets also had 20 warheads which could have been fitted in hours.” ( Anonymous, Time, November 7, 1983, Time, p. 50)Monday, October 15Photographs of Cuba were first analyzed by specialists in the early evening. At 8:30 pm a CIA agent telephoned McGeorge Bundy, the president’s special advisor on national security affairs. A briefing was held at Gen. Maxwell Taylor’s home for some of the defense department. Tuesday, October 16Intelligence experts had worked that night on a report. At 8:00 am an intelligence officer delivered the report to Bundy at the White House. Before 9:00 the message had been delivered to the president. From this point forward pressures and tension built in Washington. At 11:45 the executive Committee of the National Security Council assembled. Here they considered the alternatives ahead of them. These included doing nothing, and losing credibility, bombing the Cuban bases or invading Cuba, and lastly a blockade. “President Kennedy planned on an air strike, at least on the missiles, as something ” we are certainly going to do.” (anonymous, Time Nov.7 1983, p.50). Two decisions were made that evening. The first was to increase air surveillance of Cuba. Secondly they decided not to take any action until further information was gained, even though urgency was increasing.Wednesday, October 17The president was absent this day on speaking dates. The top level planning group met at the State Department. They discussed the possibilities of an air strike to remove the missiles. This would mean the bombing of airfields, aircraft, and all possible nuclear warhead storage sites. This would mean an awful lot of deaths, almost surely drawing a Russian retaliation. The possibility of a blockade was also discussed and looked promising, except for the legal issues. This is a prime example of how difficult decision making is under the stressful conditions of a crisis.The U-2’s provided more photographic evidence of missiles increasing urgency and thus tension. ” They provided more evidence of the medium range (1000 mile) missiles at San Cristobal and also showed intermediate range (2000 mile) sites under construction in the Guanajay area between San Cristobal and Havana. It was estimated intermediate range sites would be ready by 1 December. Later other intermediate sites were found at Remedios in eastern Cuba.” (Beggs, 1971, p. 19) This showed that the bases were being constructed, so there would be no time to waste, the Americans had to act quickly. This increased the pressure on the planning group to come to an immediate decision.Thursday, October 17Newspaper reports began writing about a buildup of air power in the southeastern United States. These reports were adding more pressure to the urgency of a quick solution. ” By the middle of the week there were 5000 marines at sea and 40 ships converging on the Caribbean.” (Beggs, 1971, p. 20)For the most part of the day the president was not at the State Department for crisis discussions. At 5:00 pm President Kennedy was to meet Andrei A. Gromyko in a conference scheduled prior to the crisis. Gromyko stated that any Russian action in Cuba was strictly defensive. Kennedy did not confront him with what he knew. That night investigation went into the legality of a blockade. As well the legal advisor of the U.S. was in Paris to stop trade from the west in to Cuba.Friday, October 19Before leaving for political campaigning the president expressed his approval towards a blockade, or in his words a quarantine. At 10:00 am the planners met. They discussed how to go about a blockade, and the chances of going with an air strike. Although work was done on alternatives, the decision went to the blockade. “That night the Defense Department’s general council was contacted by Deputy Nichol Katzenbach. He asked them to start drafting a blockade proclamation.” (Beggs, 1971, pp. 22) Many of the planners were questioning what reactions would take place due to the blockade. A proclamation of such a major action was bound to increase the pressure for all sides in the crisis. Saturday, October 20The president cancelled the rest of his trip, and would be flown back to Washington. “This was due to a slight infection of the upper respiratory tract, with one degree of fever. The story was false.”(Cook, 1972, p.65) Kennedy returned at 1:37 to the White House. He was then briefed and given the first of five drafts of a speech for Monday evening. That night the president ordered preparations for a blockade. It was to begin on his word the next day. By this point the public had an idea of some sort of problem. “The smell of crisis hung over Washington that evening.” (Beggs, 1971, P. 22) Preparations were being made for the speech Monday night at 7:00 pm.