Escalation Of Vietnam Essay Research Paper Mr

Escalation Of Vietnam Essay, Research Paper

Mr. President:

It is my observation that at this point in your administration you are enjoying considerable latitude with the American public. Your overwhelming victory in the recent election has illustrated your popularity. The platform on which you ran promised the American public that our boys would not be sent to die in Vietnam. If you are going to act on your word, and end the war in Vietnam, the time is now.

It is also my observation that your top aides having been overwhelming you with advice in the opposite direction. Your beloved Robert McNamara, whose opinion you value deeply, has made this war his personal project. He is guaranteeing that the war can be won within two and a half years. He has stated that there is no risk of a catastrophe. He and General Westmoreland feel confident that the war can be won. However, they have continually been asking for more and more troops since mid-1964. You have already agreed to send more marines and authorize offensive operations. If there is no limit set on the number of troops, it becomes easier and easier to keep sending them.

What is our clear military objective? Do our military leaders have a strategic plan for victory? Again in June, General Westmoreland has asked for more troops. After McNamara was sent in July to assess the situation in Saigon, he returned with the request to raise the American presence from 75,000 to 175,000 with a possible 100,000 more to follow. Does this sound like the promises you have made to the American public? The goals of your administration, the Great Society, will have to be halted and perhaps never completed should you lose the support of the public and Congress.

In your recent meeting on July 21st with your top aides, it is evident that you feel you are continuing down the right path towards escalation. George Bundy has become militant in his stance, and is urging you to escalate and not to be deterred by the risk of a ground war with China. Dean Rusk is finally embracing the bombing and the dispatch of troops, stressing the importance of doing whatever was needed ?to throw back Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression without a major war if possible.? McNamara, to whom fell the responsibility for overseeing this new American conflict seems of two minds. He has bemoaned the heavy military emphasis on the operation and even expressed an interest in putting the Vietnam issue before an international forum for discussion. But now, he has become impatient for getting down to the details of winning and feels that abandoning Vietnam would produce ?a complete shift in the world balance of power? and would have bad domestic repercussions, including ?a disastrous political fight? and even an erosion of political freedom. On the other hand, saving Vietnam would, he argued, have a range of benefits, including setting the stage for efforts at economic development and population control in a ?gigantic arc from South Vietnam to Iran and the Middle East, ? proving the worth of a moderate, democratic way of growth for societies.?

Favoring my position is Undersecretary of State George Ball. He has been perhaps the most persistent critic of escalation, and has repeatedly stressed the implications involved in sending American troops. They would go into Vietnam as foreigners lacking local cooperation and good intelligence in fighting in unfavorable jungle terrain. On July 21st, Ball one last time warned you that for the United States as with France earlier, ?a long protracted war will disclose our weakness, not our strength.? American troops would be fighting in a hostile environment on terms to be decided by the enemy for survival of a weak and unstable government that would constantly run the risk of Chinese intervention. President Johnson you are worried about the loss of national credibility if you do not honor the repeated commitments made to South Vietnam. The worst blow would be that the mightiest power in the world is unable to defeat guerillas.

It must feel natural to continue at this point of the war. You have public approval for the bombing and escalation. Congress has proved their support by the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and has confirmed its intentions in May by offering overwhelming support for additional appropriations to intensify efforts in Vietnam. Congressional leaders have given you their backing. Even the media has played a consensus-building role by picturing Vietnam as this administration sees it: as part of the Cold War struggle.

Mr. President, I need not remind you how fickle the American public has been on this issue. Before the Tonkin Gulf clash, almost two-thirds of the public knew little about Vietnam, and those who did were deeply divided. After the February 1965 bombing, several influential Americans and critics in the Senate began to speak out. By March, college campuses had broken out into protests with faculty teaching out against your policy. You have seen the effects of the Korean War on Truman?s presidency. We have learned that the public has no taste for Asian land wars. If you choose to continue, you will be falling into your own portrayal of Senator Barry Goldwater whom you ruthlessly depicted as a man leading the American troops into a dangerous conflict.

Mr. President, I realize that you are a man who rises to meet challenges and does not accept defeat. I also realize that