Are the differences between nation-states more significant than the similarities?

Тема: Are the differences between nation-states more significant than the similarities? Yavlyayutsya li razlichiya mezhdu gosudarstvami bole glubokimi chem shodstva?
Contents:
Nation, state, nation-state.
National political systems in comparison.
Modern classifying systems in comparison.
Methods and approaches of nation-states comparison.
Nation-state is a fusion of two dissimilar structures and principles, the one political and territorial, the other historical and cultural. The 'state' element here signifies the modern,
Rational state which came to fruition in the early modem West as a set of public instiautonomous of other institutions, differentiated, centralized and possessing the monopoly of coercion and extraction in a demarcated and recognized territory. The nation, defined as a named human community with a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and standardized mass culture, possessing a single territory, division of labour and legal rights for all members, includes elements of ethnic culture and modem 'civic' features. The resulting dualism and ambiguities in the concept of the nation affects its subsequent fusion with the state. The more pronounced the civic, territorial elements of the nation the less difficult has been the process of fusion, conversely, the more prominent the ethnic elements the less likelihood of harmony or a close knit between state and nation. Even in the few cases where state and nation are more or less co-extensive in territory and congruent in social and cultural composition, this is more the result of an ethnic nationalism which strove to gain independent statehood for an ethnically defined nation, than a parallel development of state institutions and a civic nationality.
The great majority of so-called nation-states are polyethnic in composition and could more adequately be described as state-nations. This applies particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. Here the decolonized new states must base their nationalist aspirations on the territory and institutions of the state and integrate ethnically heterogenous popu-lations through a civic nationalism. Often lacking an ethnic core on which to build a state, let alone a nation, these nations-to-be are furthest removed from the nation-state goal that has become the criterion of inter-national legitimacy. Next come those new states that possess an ethnic core (Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Iran, Egypt, Zimbabwe) but also significant ethnic minority communities, many of which are politically active and unwilling to accept the culture and ascendancy of the dominant ethnic; here too the prospects of achieving the status of nation-state in the foreseeable future seem remote. The chances of the more advanced and older western states doing so are greater, but they also may suffer from deep internal ethnic cleavages, as in Spain, Belgium and Canada. Nevertheless, they possess the advantage of more solidly entrenched state institutions and widely dif-fused civic ideals; these are also features of polyethnic immigrant societies in the Americas and Australia. While it is common to term the western and even the immigrant societies nation-states, recent developments such as the 'ethnic revival' have revealed the error of this assumption. Only in a very loose and historical sense can they be called nation-states, since they enjoyed that status internationally before ethnic nationalism had spread to their own ethnic minority communities (Bretons, Basques, Scots, Flemish, Quebecqois, etc.). But in reality only some 10 per cent of the world's states can be accorded the status of nation-state, in the strict sense - that is, where state territories and institutions are occupied by members of a single ethnically defined nation with a homogeneous culture. It was the historical error of according that status to certain western seaboard states, notably England and France at the height of their power, that endowed the ideal of the homo-geneous nation-state with such prestige and allowed the internal political agenda to focus on less divisive issues than ethnicity. It remains to this day a powerful, but no longer universal, political ideal.


The term nation-state is used so commonly but defined so variously that it will be well to indicate its usage in this article with some precision and to give historical and contemporary examples of nation-states. To begin with, there is no single basis upon which such systems are established. Many states were formed at a point in time when a people sharing a common history, culture, and language discovered a sense of identity. This was true in the cases of England and France, which were the first nation-states to emerge in the modern period, and of Italy and Germany, which were established as nation-states in the 19th century. In contrast, however, other states, such as India, the former Soviet Union, and Switzerland, have come into existence without a common basis in race, culture, or language. It must also be emphasized that contemporary nation-states are creations of different historical periods and of very varied circumstances. Before the close of the 19th century the effective mobilization of governmental powers on a national basis had occurred only in Eu-rope, the United States, and Japan. It was not until the 20th century and the collapse of the Ottoman, Habsburg, French, and British empires that the world could be fully organized on a national basis.
The characteristics that qualify these variously comand historically differing entities as nation-states and distinguish them from other forms of social and political organization amount in sum to the independent power to compel obedience from the populations within their territories. The state is, in other words, a territorial association that may range in size , in population, and that claims supremacy over all other associations within its boundaries. As an association, the state is pecu-liar in several respects: membership is compulsory for its citizens; it claims a monopoly of the use of armed force within its borders; and its officers, who are the government of the state, claim the right to act in the name of the land and its people.
A definition of the state in terms only of its powers over its members is not wholly satisfactory, however. Alall states make a claim to supremacy within their boundaries, they differ widely in their ability to make good their claims. States are, in fact, often challenged by competing associations within their boundaries; their su-premacy is often more formal than real; and they are sometimes unable to maintain their existence. Moreover, a definition in terms of power alone ignores the fact that there are great differences among states in the structures they employ for the exercise of power, in the ways they use power, and in the ends to which they turn their powSome of these differences are explored in the discusthat follows of two general categories of nation-states: the unitary state and the federal state. Partly from administrative necessity and partly because of the presof territorial interests, nearly all modern states pro-vide for some distribution of governmental authority on a territorial basis. Systems in which power is delegated from the central government to subnational units and in which the grant of power may be rescinded at the will of the central government are termed unitary systems. Sysin which a balance is established between two auton-omous sets of governments, one national and the other provincial, are termed federal. In federal systems, the provincial units are usually empowered to grant and take away the authority of their own subunits in the same manner as national governments in unitary systems. Thus, although the United States is federally organized at the national level, each of the 50 states is in a unitary relationship to the cities and local governments within its own territory.
. A majority of all the world's naare unitary systems, including Belgium, BulFrance, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Japan, Poland, Romania, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and many of the Latin American and African countries. There are great differences among these unitary states, however, in the institutions and procedures through which their central governments interact with their terri-torial subunits.
In one type of unitary system, decentralization of power among sub-national governments goes so far that in pracalthough not in constitutional principle, they resemfederal arrangements. In Britain, for example, there are important elements of regional autonomy in the relabetween Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland and the national government in London; and the complex system of elected local governments, although in consti-tutional theory subject to abrogation by Parliament, is in practice a fixed and fairly formidable part of the appara-tus of British government. In other unitary systems of this type, decentralization on a territorial basis is actually provided for constitutionally, and the powers of locally elected officials are prescribed in detail. Thus, the Japa-nese constitution specifies certain autonomous functions to be performed by local administrative authorities.
A second type of unitary system makes substantially less provision for territorial decentralization of authority and employs rather strict procedures for the central suof locally elected governments. The classic ex-ample of this type is France. Its system combines central supervision of local affairs through appointed officers with territorial representathrough locally elected governments.
A third type of unitary system provides for only token decentralization. In such cases, the officials responsible for managing the affairs of the territorial subdivisions are appointees of the central government, and the role of locally elected officers is either minimal or nonexistent.Examples of this kind of arrangement include Germany under Adolf Hitler and also several Communist coun
Federal systems. In federal systems, political authoriis divided between two autonomous sets of governone national and the other sub-national, both of which operate directly upon the people. Usually a consti-tutional division of power is established between the nagovernment, which exercises authority over the whole national territory, and provincial governments that exercise independent authority within their own territo-ries. Most of the largest countries in the world — Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, the United States—are organized on a federal basis. Federal states also include Austria, Cameroon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Switzerland, Tanzania, Venezuela, Germany and Russia.
The governmental structures and political processes found in these federal systems show great variety. One may distinguish, first, a number of systems in which fedarrangements reflect rather clear-cut cultural divi-sions. A classic case of this type is Switzerland, where the people speak four different languages—German, French, Italian, and Romansh—and the federal system unites 22 historically and culturally different entities, known as cantons. The Swiss constitution of 1848, as modified in 1874, converted a confederation originally formed in the 13th century by the three forest cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden into the modern federal state. The prin-cipal agencies of federal government are a bicameral legislature, composed of a National Council representing the people directly and a Council of States representing the constituent members as entities; an executive branch (Bundesrat) elected by both houses of the legislature in joint session; and a supreme court that renders decisions on matters affecting cantonal and federal relations.
In other systems, federal arrangements are found in conjunction with a large measure of cultural homogeneiThe Constitution of the United States delegates certain activities that concern the whole people, such as the con-duct of foreign relations and war and the regulation of interstate commerce and foreign trade to the federal gov-ernment; certain other functions are shared between the federal government and the states; and the remainder are reserved to the states. Although these arrangements retwo separate bodies of political officers, two judicial systems, and two systems of taxation, they also allow extensive interaction between the federal government and the states. Thus, the election of Congress and the Presithe process of amending the Constitution, the levy-ing of taxes, and innumerable other functions necessitate cooperation between the two levels of government and bring them into a tightly interlocking relationship.
A nation state is a political community with three major propor capabilities of integration. These are first, that it is able to exercise a monopoly of political authority and legitimate force within its territory; second, that it has a government which is a decision-making centre able to determine or significantly influ-ence the allocation of resources in the society; and third, that it operates as a focus for political identification, loyalty and sup-port amongst the population. These capabilities may be described as coercive, instrumental and identive. When all these capabilities are functioning satisfactorily, they are normally assumed to be mutually reinforcing. The existence of disaf-fected or separatist groups indicates at least some failure of inteThe resurgence of minority nationalisms in advanced western societies has thus renewed interest in the complex prob-lems of maintaining the state in polyethnic societies. Moreover, by exposing shortcomings in the identive and instrumental capaof such states, it raises two general issues relevant to the persistence of the state. In particular it suggests first, that the extent and effectiveness of political integration in advanced societies has possibly been overestimated and second, that the traditional centralist state may not be fully capable of making an effective or adequate response to the challenge of ethno-territorial disaffection and national separatism.


There are approximately 156 states in the world, only about a dozen of which may be described as mono-ethnic, but several hundred ethnic groups. States are increasingly expected to provide security, order, justice, economic development and social progress for their heterogeneous societies at a time when ethno-national interests are more widespread and often more virulent than ever before. Many ethnic demands, however, except on the part of small numbers of extremists, are not necesfor political independence, which many regard as imprac-ticable and undesirable, but for recognition together with administrative and economic support to preserve their cultural identity. If this is the case the problem facing the state is more tractable and solutions which could preserve the integrity of the state more likely to be found.
To compare is a natural way of thinking. Nothing is more natural than to study people, ideas, or institutions in relation to other people, ideas, or institu-tions. We gain knowledge through reference. Scientific comparison is not of a different nature, although the intellectual level is higher. We compare to evalmore objectively our situation as individuals, a community, or a nation. A sociologist who compares discovers the pitfall of ethnocentrism, and by the same token may find a way to overcome it.
International comparison requires an articulated conceptual framework. Social scientists who analyze only one country may proceed step by step, with-out structured hypotheses, building analytical categories as they go. Comparativists have no such freedom. They cannot advance without tools. Confronted with a variety of contexts, they are obliged to rely on abstractions, to master concepts general enough to cope with the diversity of the cases under consideraWhen concentrating on a single country, a single culture, a single system, one may possibly grope.
Comparativists, on the contrary, need a compass that will allow them to pass from one contest to another, to select in each country the differences or similarities that can be integrated into the general scheme.
Comparison is the engine of knowledge. Because the comprehension of a single case is linked to the understanding of many cases, because we perceive the particular better in the light of generalities, international comparison in-creases tenfold the possibility of explaining political phenomena. The observer who studies just one country could interpret as normal what in fact appears to the comparativist as abnormal. Even that which is most familiar can escape perception. Was ist bekannt, ist nicht erkannt, underlined Hegel. The problem is not merely to evaluate the banality or the singularity of these kinds of phe
Comparison is a universal method in the social sciences; it is worthwhile not only to those who study an international field. Even if we intend to study electoral participation in a single country, we proceed by comparisons: between men and women, young and old, city dwellers and rural villagers, and so on. Even for this kind of study, international comparisons might provide supple-mentary support. One would better understand the behavior of French workers if one were to establish points of reference in some neighboring countries. It is easier to identify trends in the British economic development by analyzing what happened at the same time in Germany or France. It is not surprising that the historical method is so often combined with the comparative method.
Functional equivalence is most useful when we consider highly contrasting countries. Functionalists have, in fact, purposefully designed it to make possicomparison between two countries when one is structured in an embryonic way and the other has reached a high level of structural differentiation. For example, it would be easier to compare Germany and Austria without the conof functional equivalence than it would be to compare Indonesia and Can
Necessarily, the more a system develops, the more it becomes differentiated; the specialization of structures tends to grow until each particular function is performed by a specific institution. It is incumbent upon the comparativist to bring to light the way in which various specialized political agencies have hiscrystallized—executive power, legislatures, bureaucrats, courts—and to indicate which different functions could be fulfilled by similar structures in various historic, cultural, or systemic contexts.
Advanced nations have largely eliminated vertical cleavages as a result of unified educational systems, mass media, and political party networks at the national level. In these countries, the significant cleavages are at the level of socioeconomic interests; even ideologies are rooted in these conflicting interests. Religious or regional allegiances, except in consociational democracies, have lost much of their weight; social stratification is primarily horizontal.
This is not true for most of the developing countries, which retain very important and deeply rooted vertical structures. One would certainly find, from this point of view, very great differences between Latin America and Black Af-rica, for instance. In the one area, there exists a tremendous amount of religious and linguistic homogeneity.
Anglo-Saxon nations are a good example of a discontinuous series of coununited by a common political culture. One can ask if what they have in common weighs heavier in the balance than what differentiates them. Thus geographical proximity is neither the sole nor necessarily the best way of defining a relatively homogeneous world. Some countries can be in different continents and yet present striking similarities. Cultural kinship or historical heritage can have more weight than proximity. But other characteristics can enable comparisons between countries that are at the four corners of the earth. One could thus choose France, Japan, and Austria for a study on state centralism; or Hong Kong, Sing-apore, Uruguay, and Luxembourg to form a series of mini-states; or Canada and Malaysia as multiethnic entities.
It is not always easy to make a distinction between socio-cultural context and political structure as the two intercommunicate, and an analogy at one of these levels generally leads to an analogy at the other. But the emphasis may be either on culture or on structure.
In the natural sciences it is easy to predict the results of an experiment carried out in a laboratory. History, by contrast, never repeats itself. The same causes will never produce the same results because they will never be recombined in the same way. Even if the scientific spirit is capable of identifying a large number of factors, "historical events result from a combination of factors which is unique."1
This does not impede social scientists from leaning toward prediction. This propensity is more visible in economics and demography, which are rich in curves of evolution that seem naturally to call for extrapolation. A birthrate or a production of steel or electric energy seems more predictable than the comfeatures of political institutions or behaviors. But the desire to forecast the future does not spare any discipline in the social sciences.
Contents:
Nation, state, nation-state.
National political systems in comparison.
Modern classifying systems in comparison.
Methods and approaches of nation-states comparison.

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